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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice is not the most likely subject to come to mind
when one thinks about the Employees Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").' However, several recently published articles have docu-
mented the relationship between ERISA and contemporary actions in the
area of malpractice law.2 Under ERISA, medical malpractice law has
become the chess game of the nineties. Courts continually have to
respond to moves and countermoves by those attempting to play the
game without encountering the checkmate of malpractice law: ERISA
preemption. 3 Until recently, attorneys for health maintenance organiza-
1. Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355 (1994); 0. Mark Zamora,
Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's
Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047 (1995); Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health
Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1674 (1994).
3. ERISA contains a broad preemption clause which reads as follows:
§ 1144. Other laws
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any [covered] employee benefit plan
(b)(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:131
tions ("HMO's"), independent physician associations ("IPA's"), and
preferred provider organizations ("PPO's"), have frequently shielded
their respective organizations from liability for negligence by classifying
all medical decisions as "benefit determinations" of an ERISA-protected
employee benefit plan.4
The recent Supreme Court decision in New York State Conf. of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans, et al. v. Travelers Ins. Co. et al. ("Travel-
ers"), however, indicates that the rules of this game may be changing.'
This Note will place ERISA preemption in a historical perspective and
attempt to ascertain the impact of the Travelers decision in the area of
state medical malpractice law. More importantly, this note will survey
post-Travelers judicial opinions in an attempt to assess the existing state
of ERISA preemption and to suggest strategic moves to avoid the
"checkmate."
II. THE TRAVELERS DECISION
In Travelers, several commercial insurers, acting as fiduciaries of
ERISA health plans (the "plans"), filed suit against individual authorities
of the State of New York.6 The insurers alleged that a New York Stat-
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
ERISA § 1144 (a), (b)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
4. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-32 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Pilot Life v. Dideaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987)). The court in Corcoran found that "Ct]he
principle of Pilot Life that ERISA preempts state law claims alleging improper handling of benefit
claims is broad enough to cover the cause of action asserted here." Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
In Pilot Life, the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for an allegedly improper
denial of disability benefits. 481 U.S. at 43. Similarly, the plaintiff in Corcoran was seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. However, the cause of action was not based on improper
handling of benefits. Rather, it was based on negligence in the denial of benefits. The Corcorans
alleged that the insurance company was making "medical decisions," and that it had done so
negligently. While the Corcoran court accepted that United was making medical determinations,
it felt compelled by Pilot Life to find that those "medical determinations" were being made as
"part and parcel" of the benefit determinations, and therefore were preempted by ERISA.
Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
5. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
6. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The plaintiffs:
Health Insurance Association of America, American Council of Life Insurance, Life Insurance
Council of New York, Inc., Aetna Life Insurance Co., Aetna Health Plans of New York, Inc.,
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., The Union Labor Life Insurance Co., Professional Insurance
Agents of New York, Inc. Trust, New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference
and Health Services Medical Corporation, MVP Health Plan, Wellcare of New York, Mid-Hudson
Health Plan, Oxford Health Plan, Capital District Physicians Health Plan, Choicecare Long Island,
Independent Health, Travelers of New York, Physicians Health Services, Preferred Care and U.S.
Healthcare. The Defendants: Mario M. Cuomo (Governor of the State of New York), Mark
Chassin, M.D. (Commissioner of Health), Salvatore R. Curiale, (Superintendent of Insurance),
Mary Jo Bane (Commissioner of Social Services), Robert Abrams (Attorney General), New York
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ute7 requiring most private insurers and HMO's, but not Blue Cross &
Blue Shield (the "Blues"), to pay surcharges on hospital charges, was a
state law "relating to" employee benefit plans, and therefore was prohib-
ited by ERISA. The district court for the Southern District of New York
held that the insurance regulation, though not aimed directly at them,
had a significant impact on ERISA plans.8 The court therefore granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part and denied defendants'
motion and cross-motions for summary judgment.9 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Shaw and Pilot Life, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed.' The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari." Finding that the surcharges at issue did not "relate to" an
employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA's preemption pro-
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and the
Hospital Association of New York State.
7. See id. at 999 (citing N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§2807-c(l) (Consol. Supp. 1995)
(repealed 1996)). The statute required that insurance carriers of patients covered by any type of
health plan, with the exception of the Blues, HMO's, or government plans, pay a 13% surcharge
above the established diagnosis related group ("DRG") rate. The surcharge was to be retained by
the hospital to provide a fund for indigent care. The New York Omnibus Revenue Act of 1992
temporarily increased the surcharges by an additional 11% for private insurance companies. N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (l1l)(i) (Consol. Supp. 1995). The statute also included a nine
percent surcharge on previously exempt HMO's if they did not have a specified percentage of
Medicaid-eligible enrollees in their plans. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (2-a)(b) (Consol.
Supp. 1993). However, these surcharges were to be paid into a statewide pool.
Also at issue in Travelers was an Actuarial Information Letter (No. 5), which regulated how
self-insured plans obtain stop-loss insurance. It provided that: (1) self-insured plans could only
obtain stop-loss protection if the plan provided statutorily determined benefit packages; (2)
required self-insured plans to provide beneficiaries a statutory conversion policy and (3) required
self-insured plans to provide protections against plan insolvency. 813 F. Supp. at 1011-12.
8. See id. at 1011-12; see also Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 141 (1987).
9. See id. at 1012 (holding that statute's surcharge had a significant economic effect on
ERISA plans and was therefore preempted). The district court reasoned that based on prior cases,
the test for whether a state law preempted an ERISA plan was whether it had any effect on the
costs of the plan.
10. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). Shaw held that ERISA's preemption clause must be read
broadly to reach any state law having a connection with, or reference to, covered benefit plans. In
Pilot Life, the Supreme court stated that the term "relate to" is to be accorded "its broad common-
sense meaning." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). "Under this 'broad
common-sense meaning,' a state law may 'relate to' a benefit plan, and thereby be preempted,
even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is only indirect ....
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47).
Based on these holdings, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the
surcharges in question would increase the costs of insurance and HMO health care so as to
interfere with the choices that ERISA plans would make for health care coverage by deliberately
making some insurance more attractive than others. See Travelers, 14 F.3d at 719. Accordingly,
the regulation constituted a "connection with" ERISA plans, thereby triggering preemption. Id. at
719-20.
11. See New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
305 (1994).
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vision,12 the Court held that the statute was not preempted.' 3
Looking at ERISA's objectives as a guide to the scope of the state
law that "Congress understood would survive,"' 4 the Court found that
the "basic thrust of the pre-emption clause ... was to avoid a multiplic-
ity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration
of employee benefit plans."' 5 With that in mind, the Court found that
ERISA preempts state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or
their administration, as well as those that provide alternative enforce-
ment administration.' 6 The Court in Travelers found that the purpose of
the challenged surcharges is to make the Blues, who provide coverage to
many high risk subscribers that commercial insurers normally reject,'7
more attractive to plan purchasers. Therefore, the Court held that the
surcharges did have an indirect economic effect on choices that insur-
ance purchasers would make.' 8 However, the Court went on to explain
that an indirect economic influence does not bind plan administrators to
12. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
13. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676-83 (1995).
14. Id. at 1677.
15. Id. at 1677-78.
16. See id.; see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)(ruling that "[New York's]
Human Rights Law... and [New York's] Disability Benefits Law ... requires employers to pay
employees specific benefits . . .[and therefore] clearly 'relate[s] to' benefit plans."); FMC v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (providing that state law that prohibited plans from requiring
reimbursement from beneficiary in the event of recovery from a third party 'related to' employee
benefit plans as contemplated by ERISA. The costs of foregoing reimbursements would depend
on the state in which the plan was located, and therefore would not result in "uniform
legislation.").
17. The Blues have traditionally maintained an "open-enrollment" policy. See GEORGE A.
ANNAS ET AL., AMERIcAN HEALTH LAW 17-22 (1990). This open-enrollment policy, combined
with a "community rating" charge, has increasingly put the Blues at a disadvantage in the
insurance marketplace. Under an open-enrollment policy, anyone who cares to purchase
insurance will be accepted. See id. A community rating scheme provides that the premiums
charged will be uniform for the entire community of subscribers. See id. When these two factors
are combined, the result is an enrollment community made up of a non-risk-selected population.
See id. Logically, a non-risk-selected population will consist of a greater proportion of higher risk
participants. See id. Because the Blues charge all participants the same premium based on
community experience, the community rating costs are higher for all participants, which, in turn,
makes the Blues premiums higher than those for commercial insurers. See id. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that employed people statistically are healthier than unemployed people,
which means that providing employee insurance is traditionally less expensive. See id. In
addition, the majority of insured people are employed and obtain their insurance through
employee benefit plans. So the Blues take everyone, but have higher rates than commercial
insurers. Unemployed persons, who are traditionally at higher risk, and employed persons to
whom medical benefits are not available, will most likely not be able to afford the higher
premiums offered by the Blues. See id. Although the Blues now have a risk selection option
which offers lower premiums, they still have their traditional open-enrollment, community rating
scheme.
18. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
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any particular choice of providers.1 9 It does not preclude uniformity in
administrative practices. 20  Nor does it preclude the provision of a uni-
form interstate benefit package.21  Rather, the Court held that the indi-
rect economic influence "simply bears on the costs of benefits and the
relative costs of competing insurance to provide them."2
Understanding this portion of the Court's opinion is crucial to
determining the impact that Travelers may have on a plaintiff's ability to
avoid ERISA preemption and successfully keep tort actions against pro-
spective review decisionmakers in state courts.23 In particular, the Court
reasoned that "cost-uniformity almost certainly is not an object of pre-
emption. '24 Rate differentials are common even in the absence of state
action, and therefore the Court found it unlikely that ERISA meant to
bar such indirect influences under state law. The Court offered "quality
control standards" as an example of a traditional area of state regulation
that could impose indirect economic cost on a state plan.25  Further, the
19. See id. at 1679.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id. In fact, the Court stated that "[c]harge differentials for commercial insurers, even prior
to state regulation, 'varied dramatically across regions."' Id. (citation omitted). More
importantly, however, was the Court's statement that "the existence of other common state action
with indirect economic effects on a plan's costs leaves the intent to pre-empt even less likely." Id.
"Indeed, to read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and charges
on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA ... could not be squared with [the Court's prior
announcements]." Id. at 1679-80 (emphasis added).
23. This requires an understanding of the relationship between malpractice and ERISA, along
with the complications that prospective utilization review has added to the field. See infra notes
47-51.
24. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680. The Court stated that "laws with only an indirect economic
effect on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are a far cry from
those 'conflicting directives' from which Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans." Id. See also
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990); 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Williams) ("With the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive
and enforcement provisions ... are intended to pre-empt the field for Federal regulations, thus
eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit
plans.").
25. Malpractice liabilty is the traditional mechanism for assuring quality health care delivery.
See ANNAS, supra note 17 at 399-415. Although arguably ineffective, it still is the predominate
method of assuring quality. See id.; see also Pittman, supra note 2 at 422-30 (arguing that tort law
is necessary to ensure accountability in medical decision-making). Professor Pittman proposes
that state medical malpractice lawsuits against the doctors and nurses who actually make the
prospective utilization review decisions are supported by ERISA's purpose of protecting
employees. See id. at 436-42. He proposes that the courts carefully scrutinize a defendant's use
of an affirmative defense consisting of ERISA preemption. See id. at 441. He would suggest
requiring the defendant insurance plan to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that the
application of a state's medical malpractice laws and lawsuits would create such administrative
inefficiencies that the benefit plan would have to conduct its prospective utilization review
functions differently in different states," so as to preclude uniformity in regulation from state to
state. Id. at 420. In the alternative, Professor Pittman suggests that, should the court fail to find
that such malpractice actions are not "too tenuous, remote or peripheral," so as to escape
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Court went on to say that the "mandates for rate differentials would not
be pre-empted unless other regulation with indirect effects on plan costs
would be superseded as well."12 6 The Court did not address the question
of whether the surcharges could be applied to self-insured funds, but
instead left it to the court of appeals to consider on remand.27 On
remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
surcharges could be imposed on self-insured plans as well.2" So the
applicability of the Travelers opinion should extend to self-insured plans
as well.29
This decision is remarkable for several reasons. The first is that it
narrowed the test for determining whether a state law "relates to" an
ERISA plan so as to trigger preemption. 30 The second significant aspect
is that a unanimous court rejected the principle that any law that imposes
costs upon an employee benefit plan is presumptively preempted unless
saved by ERISA's insurance savings clause, thereby allowing states to
participate in active health care reform.31 However, the most remarka-
preemption, then they should use the power that ERISA has given them to create a federal
common law. Id. at 441-42. See also Zamora, supra note 2.
26. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679 (indicating that the more traditional state regulations that the
proposed interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause would preclude, the less likely that
Congress meant to preempt that particular area of traditional state authority). But see FMC v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (stating that Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation law, while a
traditional state law, was preempted as the relationship to employee benefit plans was not "too
tenuous, remote or peripheral"). However, in FMC the ability of a company to subrogate to a
participant's claim in one state and not in another could make the plan more expensive to
administer in one state over another, and could require inconsistent procedures for claims
processing between states. See id.
27. See 115 S. Ct. at 1675, n.4.
28. See Travelers Ins. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1995). On remand, the court of appeals
found that the only time a plan's self-insured status matters is when ERISA is found to preempt a
state law. If the state law is preempted, then the applicability of the "savings clause" is
determined. See id. at 93; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). Under the savings clause, a
law that is otherwise found to "relate to" an employee benefits plan may be excepted if it is a law
that purports to regulate insurance. Then and only then will the character of the plan come into
play. The "deemer clause" provides that a self-insured employee benefit plan may not be
"deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994). Since
the Supreme Court had determined that the law at issue was not a law that "related to" an
employee benefit plan so as to trigger preemption, the insurance savings clause and the deemer
clause were inapplicable. See Travelers, 63 F.3d at 93.
29. This presents what could be an interesting problem down the line. Many self-insured
plans hire an insurance company to administer their plans. In making benefit decisions, the
insurance company will perform prospective review. If the plan brings a negligence claim against
the insurance company, it can be held liable to the plan. If the insurance company does not live up
to the applicable standard of care, the question remains whether a participant can bring a
malpractice suit against it.
30. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 (stating that if a state law produces merely an indirect
economic effect upon an ERISA plan, but does not force the ERISA plan's choice of coverage,
then it does not "relate to" the plan as envisioned by Congress, and therefore is not preempted).
31. "[N]othing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
[Vol. 51:131
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ble aspect of the decision is the Court's dicta indicating that the area of
quality control is an inherent state power that would not be preempted
were the issue to be presented to the Court.32
This Note's proposition is that the Court could have defeated pre-
emption down another path. Therefore, this Note will first provide an
analysis of the caselaw leading to the Travelers decision and the argu-
ments that have either defeated or succumbed to ERISA preemption.
Next, this Note will survey some of the lower federal courts' post-Trav-
elers decisions in an attempt to ascertain what weight they have given to
this dicta. Finally, using the post-Travelers decisions as a guidepost,
this Note will make practical suggestions to avoid ERISA preemption
defenses in actions against health plans.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Traditional Notions of Medical Malpractice
Ordinarily a patient who was damaged in some manner by a physi-
cian's negligence files suit in a state court asking for compensatory, and
if warranted, punitive damages. The plaintiff then has to establish that:
(1) the doctor owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff; (2) the
doctor has breached this duty; (3) the breach was both the proximate
cause and the cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury; and finally (4) the
patient has suffered actual damages.33
State courts have traditionally been the exclusive forum for medical
malpractice actions between persons of the same state.34 If a party in a
federal court had a federal claim that was "substantial," then the court
could, in its discretion, hear a state law claim that accompanied the fed-
eral claim.35 However, after Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, this
clear jurisdictional line became obfuscated.36 Courts began reading
chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern." Id. at 1680-81.
32. See id. at 1679-80.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1987).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people); U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. (providing jurisdiction for federal courts of the United
States).
35. Provided that the state and federal claims had a common nucleus of operative facts, the
state claim would be heard. This was originally accomplished through the doctrine of pendant
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1995).
36. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dideaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (all
holding that the phrase "relates to" is to be given its broad common sense meaning, such that a
state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase. In other words,
the law has a connection with or a reference to such a plan).
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ERISA's preemption provision very broadly so as to preclude a variety
of state law claims. Breach of contract, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and malpractice are just a few of the causes of action that
were prohibited.37 Preemption is a question governed by the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.38  That federal preemption might leave a
party without a remedy troubled the court in Corcoran, especially in the
area of prospective utilization review, but the Court felt that ERISA's
express preemption provision mandated a finding that extra-contractual
damages (i.e. pain, suffering and emotional distress) were not remedies
they could award.39
B. Traditional Notions Expanded
As medical delivery has changed over the years, states have
adapted with the development of additional causes of action in the medi-
cal malpractice arena.40 Through concepts of vicarious liability, corpo-
rate liability, and enterprise liability, states have allowed plaintiffs to
recover from health care centers for the negligence of employed physi-
37. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that ERISA preempts tort claim for emotional distress damages). The court reasoned that a
prospective review decision to deny authorization for in-patient hospital stay was not a "medical
decision," but rather was a "benefit determination." Id. In order to determine negligence in the
denial of benefits, the court would have to look at the plan and evaluate whether what was
promised was received. See id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the tort
claim was therefore preempted by ERISA. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987) (finding common law contract and tort claims arising from termination of
benefits generally applicable state claims, but preempted by ERISA).
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
39. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338. The court went on at length about how their decision
troubled them. The court recognized that its decision "eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review system." d.
The court also recognized that making liability rules inapplicable would result in "less deterrence
of substandard medical decision-making." Id. The court even recognized that the cost of paying
for malpractice judgments is not necessarily above the normal cost of doing business in the
insurance field. See id. However, the Court felt that because cost containment features did not
exist at the time ERISA was implemented, any changes in preemption should be affected by
Congressional action to prevent judicial overstepping. See id. The court also stated that "the lack
of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis." Id. at 1333; see also Shaw, 463 U.S.
at 96-97; Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 248 (5th Cir. 1990)
(both holding that state laws "relate to" employee benefit plans broadly whenever they have "a
connection with or reference to such a plan").
40. See Zamora, supra note 2 at 1053. Mr. Zamora provides an analysis of vicarious and
direct corporate liability in the HMO context.
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cians.11 A major principle behind allowing these causes of action is that,
with the increasing numbers of group-providers such as HMO's, PPO's
and IPA's, medical decisionmaking is no longer solely in the realm of
the personal physician.42 Additionally, where these medical delivery
systems are utilized, a patient's choice of a practitioner is often limited
to a specified group of approved physicians, thereby justifying holding
those health plans liable for negligence in their hiring and supervisory
practices.43 However, as the states have expanded the traditional notions
of medical malpractice so as to encompass these modem health care
delivery systems, preemption problems have increased.4
C. The Concept of ERISA Preemption
An understanding of the decisions interpreting ERISA's preemp-
tion clause is crucial to an understanding of the potential impact that the
Traveler's decision may have in the area of vicarious liability and the
ability of states to reclaim tort law. This section will focus on the pur-
pose behind enacting, and the damages that may be recovered, under
ERISA.
Congress enacted ERISA in 197441 to protect employees' expecta-
tions in pension funds and benefit plans.46 In order to do this, ERISA
41. See id. at 1052. Usually, this is accomplished through the theory of ostensible agency.
42. This arises from a combination of factors. First, an HMO may offer a physician
incentives for reducing the number of tests ordered and procedures performed. Second, an HMO
can refuse pre-authorization for particular procedures. A physician will then inform the patient of
the denial of benefits decision. The patient must then choose whether or not to undergo the
procedure. If the patient decides to forego the procedure, and an adverse reaction occurs, who
really made the decision? See generally ANNAS, supra note 17.
43. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In Boyd, the
appellate court found that certain HMO's are "total health care systems." As such, the physicians
that they hire are "ostensible agents." The key to finding an ostensible agency is whether "the
patient is (reasonably) 'looking to' the HMO rather than the individual doctor as the provider of
care, and whether the HMO has 'held out' the physician as its employee or agent." Id. at 1232-34;
ANNAS, supra note 17 at 286; see also Zamora supra note 2 at 1050.
44. See discussion supra note 42.
45. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1994).
46. At the time ERISA was enacted, there was a prevalence of employers underfunding their
pension plans. Employees were not receiving the benefits that they had been promised and
relying on. Congress provided that ERISA is meant to:
protect . . . participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by
requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added).
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contains strict requirements for funding,47 disclosure,48 and fiduciary
duty,4 9 that every plan must conform with. 51 Congress enacted ERISA's
preemption provision to assure plans a uniform set of regulations and to
prevent inconsistent regulation on plans from state to state.51
This is the rook of the chess game (i.e., the piece that blindsides
you). Standing in the path without a pawn to protect them, plaintiffs will
fall helplessly to the checkmate of ERISA's preemption clause. The
trouble is that interpretations of the "relate to" language had eliminated
far too many pawns, leaving plaintiffs increasingly exposed to
checkmate. Since ERISA was meant to supersede state law, Congress
provided a specific civil enforcement scheme to provide relief to plan
beneficiaries in the event that ERISA's requirements were violated.52 It
is not possible to discuss the confusion inherent in the "relates to" lan-
guage without addressing the civil enforcement scheme
contemporaneously. 53
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that ERISA's preemption lan-
guage should be read in light of Congress's intent at the time that
ERISA was enacted.54 In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, the Court explained
that Congress had deliberately eliminated a proposed preemption clause
that was limited to specified subjects covered by ERISA.55 Instead, the
Conference Committee removed the limiting language and indicated that
the "section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language. ' '56 The
purpose behind the elimination was to ensure that ERISA plans would
be free of the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local regula-
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (establishment of plan); §§ 1081-85 (funding requirements).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (writing requirement); §§ 1022-25 (specifics of writing
requirements).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (c).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003. ERISA applies to every plan if "established or maintained" by an
employer, employee organization or both, engaged in any industry or activity affecting commerce.
Id. However, Government, church and excess benefit plans are exempt, as are plans set up to
comply with workmen's compensation, unemployment or disability insurance laws. See 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b).
51. The preemption clause reads, in pertinent part that "this chapter shall supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (preemption clause) (emphasis added).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Pertinent to this discussion is § 1132 (a)(2), which allows plan
beneficiaries to sue under ERISA for benefits due under the plan and to enforce or declare future
rights under the terms of the plan. The phrase "to sue for benefits due him under the terms of the
plan" is the second piece to the preemption problem.
53. All to often in court opinions, the damages that plaintiffs were seeking were interpreted to
be claims under § 1132(a). In other words, an injured beneficiary sues for pain and suffering. The
court interprets that as seeking "benefits due him under the terms of the plan."
54. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-99 (1983).
55. See id. at 98 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974)).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1280.
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tion of employee benefit plans.57 Accordingly, the Court found that it
was compelled to read "relate to" in the broad common sense meaning. 8
In 1987, the Court maintained its position that "relates to" must be read
broadly to reach any state law having a connection with, or reference to,
covered employee benefit plans.59  However, in 1987, the Court held
that, even if a claim "relates to" an employee benefit plan, it may be
saved by ERISA's insurance savings clause.6°
In summary, the Supreme Court has held that a state law that
directly requires employers to offer certain medical benefits "relates to"
employee benefit plans as contemplated by ERISA, but is saved from
preemption as a law regulating insurance. 6' The Court has also held that
a state law that has an indirect effect upon an employee benefit plan is
preempted unless the relationship is too tenuous, remote or peripheral to
the plan to justify preemption.6 2 However, until the Traveler's decision,
the Court had not defined what type of law might be considered too
tenuous, remote or peripheral to escape liability. The Court has also
indicated that traditional state laws of general application may not be
subject to preemption.63 This is the crux of this Note.64 Is a state law
claim for emotional distress, wrongful death, or pain and suffering a
claim with a relationship to an employee benefit plan that is too tenuous,
remote and peripheral to the plan to be preempted? 65
57. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 99-100 n.20.
58. "A state law relate[s] to a benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. at 96-97. Accord Metropolitan Life. Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
59. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dideaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987). The Court's interpretation
of "relates to" has been anything but unwavering. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830-32 & n.6 (1988) (holding that garnishment action does not "relate
to" ERISA plan because it is a law of general applicability).
60. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48-49. Pilot Life broadened the "relates to" language even
further than Shaw had. Id. The Court's language in Pilot Life indicated that any state law claim
that could in any way "relate to" an ERISA employee benefit plan would be preempted unless
saved by ERISA's insurance savings clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("[N]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.") ("insurance savings clause"). See also Metropolitan
Life, 471 U.S. at 739-47 (defining "regulating insurance" as contemplated by ERISA).
61. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 758.
62. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 & n.1 (1992).
63. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. New York Conf. of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
1671, 1683 (1995); see also Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.
64. While the Travelers decision is extremely important to other areas of preemption analysis,
this Note's focus is limited to the area of preemption of state law quality control standards, i.e.
negligence of third party prospective utilization review decisions.
65. See Pittman, supra note 2. Professor Pittman's article argues that these traditional state
law claims should not be pre-empted by ERISA. He believes that the Court has abdicated its
rulemaking authority. Professor Pittman thinks that, if the courts refuse to stop finding complete
preemption of such state law causes of action, they should use the power given to them in ERISA
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Before one can understand the impact that the Travelers decision
may have, it is necessary to assess the pre-Travelers status of ERISA
preemption in the area of state malpractice law, particularly in the area
of vicarious liability. As the states have expanded the traditional notions
of medical malpractice to encompass modem health care delivery sys-
tems, preemption problems have increased.66
The typical scenario in the chess game of ERISA preemption is as
follows. A patient sees a physician. The physician recommends an
expensive procedure (or doesn't recommend it, as the case may be one
of incentives for decreased utilization of services).67 The insurance
company prospectively denies payment for the procedure.68 The patient
then chooses to forego the procedure for economic reasons, 69 or accepts
the offered, and usually less expensive, alternative treatment that the
health plan authorizes. 70 The patient subsequently suffers some adverse
occurrence that the originally recommended treatment might have pre-
vented. 71  The patient then wants to recover for the damages that she
incurred as a result of having to forego the recommended treatment. 72
The problem is, who does the patient recover from? If the physician was
negligent in discharging the patient, he may be liable.73 However, if it is
determined that the physician followed an appropriate standard of care,
to create federal common law causes of action to fill the gap and ensure the continuance of
accountability in the delivery of health care. See id. at 440-42.
66. See generally supra note 2; see also John 0. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in
Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REv. 191, 192 (1989); Barry
R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 985, 986-87 (1986); Rodd Zolkos, Evolution of Managed Care: Professional Liability
Issues Grow as Health Care Changes, Bus. INS., Nov. 27, 1995, at 3.
67. See Pittman supra note 2 at 361-75 (presenting description of the different incentives that
health plans offer physicians to achieve ultimate levels of cost containment).
68. See id.
69. See Wilson v. Blue Cross of So. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (patient
leaves hospital earlier than recommended due to denial of authorization for further stay; ERISA
not implicated).
70. See Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.3d 1321, 1322-24 (5th Cir. 1992).
71. See id. at 1324.
72. See id.
73. See Wickline v. State of Cal., 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Wickline, the
patient needed leg surgery. Due to various factors, the physician determined that the patient
should remain in the hospital for eight additional post-operative days. However, the insurance
company declined prospective authorization and would only approve four days of additional
hospitalization. The physician then discharged the patient. Subsequent to the discharge, she
suffered blood clots that required amputation of her leg. The court determined that if the
physician's decision to discharge had been negligent, then he could be held liable. In other words,
if the normal standard of care for a similar physician would dictate the continuing hospitalization
of the patient, and the physician had discharged anyway, then he could be held liable on a
negligence theory. See id. at 817-18. Wickline was not an ERISA case, but it clearly illustrates
the complications that third party utilization review may present to the patient attempting to
pinpoint accountability for negligent injury.
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he most likely will not be found liable.74
If the physician has not been negligent,7" who else can the patient
recover from? There is no cut and dry answer. It all depends on what
exactly the plaintiff is asking for. Because of Corcoran,76 and because
of the way that other courts have followed its lead, 7 it is extremely
difficult to bring a malpractice suit against a health plan, even where the
health plan's prospective review process causes a patient to forego some
treatment that could have prevented injury.7 8 If the health plan is an
HMO, then the patient stands a better chance of recovery. 79 However,
several courts have held that if the health plan is not an HMO, 80 or is an
HMO that does not directly deliver health services, 81 any suit against it
74. See id. The court went on to find that the physician in Wickline had not deviated from the
acceptable standard of care in deciding to discharge the patient, and therefore he was not liable for
damages. Id. at 819. This raises an interesting problem that is a corollary to the ERISA
preemption problem with regard to physician decisionmaking in light of third party prospective
utilization review. The issue is, when a physician has to obtain pre-approval for treatment, and
that treatment is not authorized by the applicable health plan, who bears the risk that the patient
will suffer some harm? In this emerging era of prospective utilization review, physicians are
making medical decisions that are not always determined by the best interest of the patient. The
predominance of health plans such as HMO's and PPO's has created a new picture of the doctor-
patient relationship, in which the decisions for medical treatment are dictated by a third party
rather than by either the physician or the patient. See Randall, supra note 2 at 18-19 (describing
the problems created by introducing a third party reviewer into the doctor-patient relationship).
75. See id. at 41-43. Professor Randall presents the difficulties a patient has to overcome in
an ordinary negligence suit against physicians because physicians set the appropriate standard of
care, and have the expertise, knowledge, and power to do so. Professor Randall describes the
complexities that introducing a third party prospective reviewer adds to the already disadvantaged
plaintiff. See id.
76. 965 F.2d 1321.
77. See, e.g., Dalton v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Healthnet, 626 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364
(N.Y. 1995) ("Even the absence of remedy will n[o]t [sic] prevent the application of the ERISA
preemption clause in appropriate circumstances.") (citing Corcoran, 465 F.2d at 1333). In
Dalton, the court found ERISA to preclude a negligent selection cause of action against a health
plan because to determine whether there was negligence would require looking at the terms of the
plan and the reasons for denial). Id. at 364-65; see also Nealy v. United States Healthcare HMO,
844 F. Supp. 966, 973-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc. 814 F. Supp. 1103, 1107
(S.D. Fla. 1993).
78. If the plan is a true HMO, which participates in the actual delivery of health care services,
then the odds of obtaining relief are higher. See Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.N.J.
1994) (stating that "[w]e concur with the reasoning adopted by... courts.., who have concluded
that ERISA preempts state law tort claims brought against an HMO for the negligence of one of
its participating physicians, where the HMO does not itself provide health care services."). See
also Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302-05 (8th Cir. 1993);
Nealy, 844 F. Supp. at 975. Cf. Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. C. of Osteopathic Med.,
Parkview Div., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-92 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that claims against HMO
under ostensible agency theory not preempted, even where HMO did not directly provide medical
care); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
79. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1232-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
80. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d 1321 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 63-64 (D. Conn. 1990).
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for recovery of damages is a suit that "relates to" the health plan and the
administration of the health plan, and as such, is preempted by ERISA.82
Perhaps even more disturbing is that the patient cannot obtain extra-
contractual damages even if she sues under ERISA.83 Most disturbing
of all is the procedural device of "complete preemption" that defendants
are using in order to render a plaintiff helpless to checkmate. 84 Accord-
ing to Metropolitan Life, any claim that is in any way an attempt to
"recover benefits" under the terms of an employee benefit plan is not
only preempted by ERISA, but is removable to federal court regardless
of whether the plaintiff pleads the "recovery of benefits." 5 This broad
reading of ERISA's preemption provision borders on the absurd.86 If
followed to its logical conclusion, any transaction that occurs between a
patient and a physician could be found to be related to the existence of a
health plan.87 Theoretically, this type of interpretation could even bar
suits for direct negligence against a physician. The doctor could simply
claim that the relationship between him and the patient only existed
because of ERISA, and therefore, any state law claim against him is
preempted. 88 In addition, to read the Court's recognition of an exception
82. Id.; see also Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1330; Butler, 853 F. Supp. at 129.
83. See Comer v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 45 F.3d 435, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1994); Harsch v.
Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1992).
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
85. 481 U.S. 58, 63-65 (1987). This runs contrary to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule as set
forth in Louiseville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). If the plaintiff does
not plead a federal question as the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, then an anticipated defense
under a federal statute will not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal court. See id. at
153-54. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a defendant may not remove a claim from state to
federal court if the plaintiff has not pled the federal question in his complaint. See Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983). The plaintiff has the
choice of forum, and, as a federal defense to a plaintiff's state law cause of action does not
ordinarily appear on the face of his complaint, there usually is not justification for removal to
federal court. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115-18 (1936). This is especially true
because ERISA provides for concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts for plaintiffs
wishing to recover benefits due them, to determine their rights to future benefits, or to enforce
their rights under the terms of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Preemption is insufficient to
justify removal to federal court. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398 (1987). The
only exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule that the Supreme Court has recognized is where
there is complete preemption. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)
(holding that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint
raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character"). The complete preemption
doctrine applies when the force of the federal statutory provision is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action addressed by the federal statute. Any suit of this nature is purely
a creature of federal law. See id. at 64 (citation omitted). The Court has determined that Congress
intended complete preemption to apply to any state law cause of action that fits within the scope
of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. See Pilot Life v. Dideaux, 481 U.S. 41, 66 n.2 (1987).
86. See generally Pittman supra note 2.
87. See id.
88. This interpretation merely carries through the logic presented in decisions such as
Corcoran and Butler. If it were not for the employee plan, the employee would never have gone
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to the well-pleaded complaint rule to extend to every possible state law
that may be preempted by ERISA, would make Congress' grant of con-
current jurisdiction superfluous.8 9 This is not the result that ERISA was
intended to bring about. The Court's decision in Travelers seems to
recognize the potential absurdity of this reading.90
D. Impact of Travelers on Preemption
As mentioned above, until recently, the outlook for recovery by our
hypothetical patient did not look promising.91 However, in February of
1995, the Supreme Court may have opened the door for states to reclaim
quality control mechanisms over the delivery of medical services.92 In
Travelers, the Court pulled back from what had been an ever increas-
ingly broad reading of ERISA's preemption provision.93 Before Travel-
ers, the Court had expansively interpreted ERISA to preempt any state
law claim which makes reference to or relates to any employee benefit
plan.94 Accordingly, the lower courts found an increasing number of
state laws preempted. 95 Among the "laws to go" were intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and wrongful death. 96
Although the Court did not specifically say that medical malprac-
tice actions are not preempted by ERISA, it would certainly be a justi-
fied decision for a lower court to make.97 This next section will analyze
to the specific doctor. Therefore, any complaint about anything arising out of the relationship
relates to the employee plan.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(e) (1994), which reads:
Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district courts of
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this
subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or
any person referred to in section 1021(0(1) of this title. State courts of competent
jurisdiction and district courts of the United states shall have concurrent jurisdiction
of actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a) of this section.
90. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. New York Conf. of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
1671, 1683 (1995).
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 130-
31 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that ERISA preempts malpractice action against health plan where
participant in plan alleged that plan negligently selected treating physician and hospital); Altieri
v. Cigna Dental Health, 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that ERISA preempts claim
where central feature of participant's claims were circumstances of participant's treatment under
employer's medical plan); Rollo v. MaxiCare, 695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988).
92. See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1682.
93. See 29 U.S.C. at § 1144(a).
94. See discussion supra notes 58-63.
95. See Pilot Life v. Dideaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987) (preempting common law causes of
action seeking damages for improper processing of claim for benefits); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983) (preempting state insurance anti-discrimination law).
96. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d. 1321, 1338-39 (5th Cir. 1992).
97. "[N]othing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
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some of the cases decided subsequent to the Travelers decision, and will
attempt to predict what types of claims might be allowed.
In dicta, the Travelers decision indicated that state law claims for
malpractice against third party prospective review systems either
directly or via vicarious liability might not be preempted by ERISA.98
The fact that the Corcoran case was decided two years before Travelers
provides hope that courts will now reconsider their "relates to" analysis.
The Court in Travelers also seemed to go to great lengths to address the
area of "traditional state law," rather than deciding that the New York
law was a law "regulating insurance." The Court also specifically men-
tioned quality control as being an area of traditionally local concern.99
Most interesting is that the Court could have found that the surcharges
did "relate to" employee benefit plans so as to trigger preemption, 100 but
did not.10
The situation would be much clearer were it not for the Corcoran
case.'0 2 The Corcoran court held that a Louisiana state law, allowing a
claim for wrongful death by alleging that a third party provider of utili-
zation review services had failed to live up to the applicable standard of
care, was preempted by ERISA. 10 3 The court also held that ERISA did
not authorize damages for emotional distress in a claim for wrongful
denial of benefits."° The Corcorans appealed this decision, and the
Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari. 0 5 While the denial of certi-
orari indicates neither approval nor disapproval for the Corcoran deci-
concern." Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985); B. FuRRow, ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 1-6, 1-23 (1995); see also
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (holding that state
general garnishment law would impose indirect administrative costs, and even might prevent plan
participants from receiving their benefits, but that as a law operating only as an indirect source of
merely economic influence on administrative decisions it should not suffice to trigger
preemption).
98. See supra notes 22-31.
99. See Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1680. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
100. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding
that a state mandating coverage of specified minimum mental healthcare benefits by insurers did
directly affect ERISA plans, but were saved from preemption by the insurance savings clause).
The Court in Travelers could have easily found that Metropolitan Life supported a finding that the
proposed surcharges "related to" employee benefit plans, and could have proceeded to save the
surcharges through the insurance savings clause. Instead, the Court decided to follow the line of
reasoning in Mackey to find that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of traditional state law
enforcement mechanisms. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.
101. See Travelers, 115 S.Ct. at 1683.
102. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 1339.
104. See id.
105. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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sion, it is interesting that the Supreme Court chose the language that it
did in handing down the Travelers decision.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Dukes
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., decided that a plaintiff's claim against an HMO
for malpractice was not preempted by ERISA. 106 In Dukes, the wife of
an HMO participant brought suit in state court alleging medical malprac-
tice and other negligence against the HMO, among others. In her com-
plaint, she alleged that the HMO was responsible, under Pennsylvania's
state ostensible agency law, for the negligence of the various doctors and
other medical service providers. 10 7 She further alleged that the HMO
had failed to exercise reasonable care in its selection, retention, screen-
ing, monitoring and evaluation of the personnel who actually provided
medical services under a theory of direct negligence.1"8 In the compan-
ion case that was decided in Duke,"°9 the plaintiff brought suit in state
court alleging negligence of the HMO via vicarious liability under an
ostensible and actual agency theory. 10 They also sued the HMO under
a theory of direct negligence."'
Here, however, the game changed. As usual, the defendant HMO's
in Dukes" 2 removed the case to federal court, claiming "complete pre-
emption" under the Metropolitan Life exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule." 3 The district court held that the the plaintiffs claims
"related to" an ERISA plan, and therefore were preempted because "any
ostensible agency claim must be made on the basis of what the benefit
plan provides and is therefore 'related' to it" and "the treatment received
must be measured against the benefit plan and is therefore also 'related'
to it." 114 The district court dismissed both claims. Check. Checkmate.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the claims to
the state court.' 15 The court cited Travelers as requiring the court to
look at the text of ERISA's preemption clause to decide whether deter-
106. 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
107. See id. (stating that an HMO may be held liable for malpractice under an ostensible
agency theory where a patient looks to the HMO for care and the HMO's conduct leads the patient
to reasonably believe that they are being treated by an HMO employee).
108. See id. at 352.
109. See Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
110. See id. at 353. The plaintiffs claimed that the HMO had held out the negligent doctor as
competent and qualified.
111. See id.
112. U.S. Healthcare, Inc,, Germantown Hospital & Medical Center, William W. Banks, M.D.,
Charles R. Drew Mental Health Center, Edward B. Hosten, M.D. and U.S. Health Care. Id. at
350.
113. See supra note 85.
114. Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Visconti v. U.S.
Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
115. See Dukes v. United Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 361 (3rd Cir. 1995).
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mination of the quality of a benefit received is actualy a claim under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) t" 6 to "recover benefits due ... under the terms of the
plan."'" 7 It also cited Travelers as requiring it to move on, if need be, to
the structure and purpose of ERISA to make the above distinction.' t8
The court found nothing to support the defendant's interpretation of
ERISA's preemption provision as defining malpractice actions as suits
"to recover benefits." '" 9 In addition, the court found that because a mal-
practice claim is not so completely a creature of federal law, that
removal jurisdiction was improper. 120
IV. CONCLUSION
The Dukes court used the Travelers decision to find a way to get
these "traditionally" state claims back into state court. Dukes has two
implications for plaintiffs attempting to hold health care plans liable for
malpractice, whether through vicarious liability for the negligence of
one of its employees, or through direct negligence for the selection,
retention and supervision of its personnel. First, plaintiffs' attorneys can
now cite Travelers as allowing malpractice claims in an area that Con-
gress did not want ERISA to preempt.' 2' Second, the attorney should
draft the complaint in such a way as to clarify that the defendant has
violated the national standard of care in making their decisions, whether
for selection, retention or supervision of personnel.' 22 Most importantly,
attorneys should cite the Travelers decision for the proposition that phy-
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994): "A civil action may be brought... [by a participant or
beneficiary] to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan or to clarify his rights to future benefits." This distinction may seem
irrelevant because ERISA provides for concurrent jurisdiction for claims for benefits under
§ 1132(a)(l)(B), but this distinction is crucial. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).
117. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Travelers' recognition that quality standards and regulations will indirectly
affect the sorts of benefits that an ERISA plan may be able to afford, but that they have
traditionally been left to the states).
120. See id. at 355. The court found that the defendants had not met their burden of
establishing that removal jurisdiction was proper. "That the Supreme Court has recognized a
limited exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for state law claims which fit within the
scope of § 502 by no means implies that all claims pre-empted by ERISA are subject to removal."
Id.
121. If the claims are carefully drafted so as not to implicate any attempt at "recovering
benefits," then the federal court may not find that the exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule
has been met, and therefore, the claim will be returned to state court. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-
57. Depending on the district that they are in, plaintiffs can cite to Dukes as either binding or
persuasive authority.
122. See, e.g., Merle Jackson v. Barry Roseman, D.M.D., 878 F. Supp. 820 (D. Md. 1995)
(ordering remand of medical malpractice claim against ERISA HMO doctor); Lawrence Paper Co.
V. Gomez, 897 P.2d 134, 143 (Kan. 1995) (holding that state law claims were not "claims to
recover benefits" and therefore were not preempted).
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sicians and nurses performing prospective utilization review decisions
are not the intended beneficiaries of ERISA preemption protection.
Doctors and nurses should not make cost-containment decisions, without
being held accountable.123 ERISA was enacted to protect employees
and to ensure that employers were encouraged to offer employee bene-
fits. More often than not, employers hire third party payors to perform
administration of their plans.124 Accordingly, more and more prospec-
tive utilization review decisions are being made with no method of
ensuring accountability.125
SYLVIA L. WENGER
123. See Pittman, supra note 2.
124. See Zamora, supra note 2; see also Randall, supra note 2.
125. With the limited exception for HMO's that are of the staff model who deliver health care
services directly. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
